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Towards a ‘transatlantic Green Deal’? How the EU can re-
engage the United States on climate change  
Simon Schunz 
The election of Joe Biden as 46th President of the United 
States (US) opens a window of opportunity for renewed 
transatlantic engagement, notably on the urgent global 
matter of climate change. In her remarks on the US election 
results, European Commission President von der Leyen 
immediately extended a hand to the new Administration, 
indicating that the “Commission stands ready to intensify 
cooperation … to address pressing challenges … notably … 
tackling climate change”, an issue on which several major 
global meetings will be organised in 2021 (European 
Commission 2020a). Her call for cooperation has since been 
reiterated by many other EU policy-makers, including via 
Commission and Council policy papers on the future of 
transatlantic relations (Herszenhorn 2020). 
 
Prior to Trump’s Presidency, the US and the European Union 
(EU) had been central players in global climate politics, with 
treaties like the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the 2015 Paris Agreement bearing the 
hallmark of transatlantic bargains. To overcome Trump’s anti-
climate legacy, which includes the US withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement – jeopardising its successful implementation 
–, the time seems now ripe to revive transatlantic climate 
cooperation. On both sides of the Atlantic, large portions of 
the public demand decisive action: 93% of EU citizens see 
climate change as a serious problem (European Commission 
2019a) compared to ‘only’ 52% in the US (Pew Research 
Center 2020). Among the Biden voters, however, support is 
much higher: over 80% of Democrats consider “dealing with 
climate change” a priority (ibid.). Young voters that helped 
Biden carry major swing states see their votes as mandates 
for progressive climate policies (Milman 2020a).  
 
The ‘European Green Deal’ (EGD) (European Commission 
2019b) and the ‘Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and 
Environmental Justice’ (Biden 2020) respond to these 
demands. Biden has repeatedly called climate change a top 
priority. One of his first measures will be to make the US re-
join the Paris Agreement – an important symbolic step (ibid.). 
Yet, the global community has moved on since 2016: its 
efforts are now about ‘implementing Paris’ in order to reach 
its 2050 net-zero emissions target. With the EDG, the EU is 
designing wide-reaching medium-term policies around this 
goal. Other players – Japan, South Africa, the United Kingdom 
(UK) – have made similar vows, whereas China committed to 
attaining the target by 2060.  
Executive Summary 
> Following the election of Joe Biden as US 
President on a strong climate and ‘clean energy’ 
platform, 2021 opens a window of opportunity to 
make progress towards a successful 
implementation of the Paris Agreement.   
> The European Union needs to seize this 
opportunity to re-connect with the US by 
supporting the Biden Administration in its 
aspirations of adopting ambitious policies 
domestically and of co-leading the global fight 
against climate change.   
> Practically, the EU can re-engage the US through 
a multi-layered outreach aimed at a dialogue and 
best-practices exchange centred around the 
European Green Deal and Biden’s clean energy 
plan. Even if the differences between the two plans 
make a ‘transatlantic Green Deal’ currently not 
realistic, they allow for solid grounds to re-
dynamise EU-US cooperation. Capitalising on this 
bilateral re-engagement, the EU should also deploy 
its global network of partnerships to facilitate the 
US re-integration into the global climate regime.  
> To enhance the effectiveness of its climate 
outreach vis-à-vis the US, the EU must bolster its 
credibility through a successful implementation of 
its Green Deal and double down on its capacities 
for transatlantic climate diplomacy, notably by 
investing into public diplomacy aimed at fostering 
cross-Atlantic debates on the carbon-neutral 
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In the run-up to the November 2021 UNFCCC Conference of 
the Parties (COP) 26 in Glasgow, major debates will be held 
bilaterally and in G-x fora on reaching the 2050 target 
through enhanced medium-term emissions reduction 
ambitions and green investments, notably as part of Covid-19 
relief plans. Re-engaging the US in meaningful ways in these 
debates will be of the essence. EU-US cooperation can be a 
cornerstone of these efforts, with the Biden Plan and the EGD 
providing useful platforms for re-engagement. Concretely, 
the EU should support the new Administration in its domestic 
efforts to realise the aims of the Biden Plan, adopt a medium-
term reduction target and make relevant investment choices. 
Simultaneously, it should signal to Biden how the US can 
return to its previous global (co-)leadership role.  
 
This policy brief presents ways in which the EU can re-engage 
the US on climate change. It starts with sequential analyses 
of the contents and prospects of the EGD and the Biden Plan 
before comparing them to explore the potential for a 
‘transatlantic Green Deal’. Although the different ‘frames’ of 
the two policy proposals imply that such a transatlantic deal 
is not yet in the cards, there is sufficient commonality to 
foster EU-US climate cooperation in the short term. The 
policy brief then proposes how the EU may practically re-
engage the US bilaterally and multilaterally before concluding 
by discussing the success factors of such an EU outreach. 
 
The European Green Deal and EU ‘Green Deal Diplomacy’ 
 
This section discusses the key features of the EGD and the 
politics of its implementation, with special attention to its 
external dimension. 
 
The EDG as a domestic transformation agenda 
 
The EGD embodies the EU’s answer to the planetary crises 
related to climate change and environmental degradation. It 
“is a new growth strategy that aims to transform the EU into 
a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-
efficient and competitive economy” centrally geared towards 
attaining the Paris Agreement’s 2050 net-zero emissions 
target (European Commission 2019b, 2). Its key 
characteristics are: 
• First, the EGD is transformative, aimed at mobilising the 
EU’s “collective ability to transform its economy and 
society to put it on a more sustainable path” (ibid., 2, 4). 
This is novel: the EU’s earlier focus on a low-carbon 
energy ‘transition’ has (at least discursively) been 
replaced by an ambition for a more profound, 
comprehensive and durable socioeconomic change; 
• Second, closely linked to this and moving from a sectoral 
to a cross-cutting, society-wide approach to 
sustainability, the EGD is holistic by pursuing the 
objective of “mainstreaming sustainability in all EU 
policies”, internal and external, most notably via “green 
finance and investment” (ibid., 15) and in policies 
ranging from agriculture and biodiversity protection to 
energy and transportation. This aspect of the EGD takes 
earlier implementation deficits of EU environmental 
policies seriously. It seeks to address the many 
contradictions that hinder sustainability in the EU, e.g., 
between progressive EU-level climate target-setting and 
national-level investments into fossil fuels; 
• Third, the EGD is “just and inclusive”: inspired by 
Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’, the EGD insists that the 
transformation should “leave no one behind” by 
alleviating transformation-induced socio-economic 
hardships through a “Just Transition Mechanism” while 
“putting people first” in the sense of involving “the 
public and … all stakeholders” in its implementation 
(ibid., 2, 16, 22). This should notably be achieved via a 
‘Climate Pact’ aiming “to inform, inspire and foster 
cooperation between people and organisations ranging 
from national, regional and local authorities to 
businesses, unions, civil society organisations, 
educational institutions, research and innovation 
organisations, consumer groups and individuals” 
(European Commission 2020b). This co-creation offer 
represents the EU’s answer to the ‘gilets jaunes’ and 
other anti-climate measures protests.  
• Fourth, the EGD involves a comprehensive, phased 
policy plan with medium- and long-term targets and 
steps. On climate change, the Commission has proposed 
to enhance the EU’s 2030 target – its Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris 
Agreement – from 40% to 55% compared to 1990 levels. 
 
Central for the prospects of implementing this 
transformation agenda is the continuous political and public 
support in the EU’s member states, which is currently lacking 
in a few countries, most notably Poland. Mobilising such 
support will be challenging and requires major 
communicative and negotiation efforts. More than anything, 
the EGD – with the Climate Pact at its heart – constitutes a 
narrative frame about an environmentally sustainable future 
of European economies and societies, which will have to be 
achieved through behavioural changes. These structural 
changes must above all be incentivised by financial 
instruments stipulating green investments. The debate about 
‘NextGenerationEU’, the EU’s Covid-19 recovery plan, is 
indicative of the significance of such incentives. At the July 
2020 European Council, the Commission and several heads of 
state and government fought hard to ultimately convince 
other member states’ governments that 37% of 
NextGenerationEU should be spent on EDG objectives.  
 
For this narrative to catch on, it is important that the EU 
demonstrates that third countries are also sustainably 
transforming their economic model. To that end, the EGD 
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The EU’s ‘Green Deal Diplomacy’ 
 
To encourage “comparable action and increased efforts by 
other regions”, the EU wishes to lead by example while 
proposing to “develop a stronger ‘green deal diplomacy’” 
(GDD) (European Commission 2019b, 20).  
Although the notion of GDD has to be further specified, the 
EGD offers pointers on what it will comprise: the EU should 
use “its diplomatic and financial tools to ensure that green 
alliances are part of its relations with … partner countries and 
regions”, including its neighbours and Africa, but also China 
(ibid., 21). With its Green Diplomacy network, the EU wishes 
to advance EGD objectives across multilateral (UNFCCC), 
plurilateral (G-20) and minilateral (G-7) fora, but also in its 
bilateral relations. These latter should serve to provide steps 
towards achieving global political advances. Such advances 
are expected primarily in areas like standard-setting via its 
single market and trade policies, the large-scale mobilisation 
of green finance and the design of a “financial system that 
supports global sustainable growth” (ibid., 22). 
 
On climate change, the EU’s relations with major emitters are 
critical. Whereas it has fostered solid climate-specific 
relations with the world’s key emitter China, the relationship 
with the historically most significant emitter, the US, has 
been all but dormant during the Trump Presidency. For the 
EGD – and the Paris Agreement – to succeed, the EU must 
attempt to rectify this. To understand how it can re-engage 
the US, it is useful to scrutinise the climate policies and 
diplomacy expected of the next US Administration. 
 
The prospects of US (federal-level) climate policies and 
diplomacy under President Biden 
 
Climate change is a top priority of the US President-elect, as 
evidenced by his strategy to campaign on the basis of the 2 
trillion USD Biden Plan. This section first discusses the Plan’s 
key features and the politics surrounding its implementation. 
It then sheds light on its external dimensions. 
 
The Biden Plan and US domestic politics  
 
The Biden Plan shares with the 2019 ‘Green New Deal’ 
proposal embraced by his intra-party rival Bernie Sanders the 
assumption that there “is no greater challenge facing our 
country and our world” than climate change; meeting it 
requires “greater ambition on an epic scale” (Biden 2020). 
 
Biden’s Plan carries its main objectives in the title: the 
envisaged ‘clean energy revolution’ is about achieving “a 
100% clean energy economy and net-zero emissions no later 
than 2050”, including a decarbonisation of the electric sector 
by 2035, and ‘environmental justice’ involving particular 
attention for vulnerable groups (ibid.). Unlike the ‘Green New 
Deal’, which merely stipulated broad long-term goals, the 
Biden Plan contains a series of specific action points. Its main 
characteristics are:  
• First, the Plan provides the blueprint for a clean energy 
transition: in terms of framing and policies proposed, it 
represents ultimately – unlike the more holistic EGD – 
an energy-focussed roadmap. Climate change receives 
significantly more mention than it did when Obama took 
office in 2009, when the focus was primarily on ‘energy 
security’. Other environmental challenges are equally 
referred to. However, what transpires centrally from 
Biden’s proposals is the concentration on large-scale 
investments into research and “the rapid deployment of 
clean energy innovations across the economy” ‘(ibid.). 
The Biden Plan’s lead narrative is thus one of a 
technological fix to the climate crisis that is beneficial in 
economic terms, creating green, ‘clean energy’ jobs.  
• Second, central to the Plan is environmental justice. 
Similar to the EGD’s ‘just transition’ focus, this is about 
both attenuating the socio-economic shocks 
experienced by “workers impacted by the energy 
transition”, which is ultimately about completely halting 
fossil fuel subsidies, and caring for “People of Color and 
Low-Income Communities … at Especially High Risk” 
from environmental degradation (ibid.). 
• Third, like the EGD, the Biden Plan contains a plethora 
of concrete policy proposals. A first priority is the setting 
of a mid-term emissions reduction target that would 
ramp up the US NDC of 26-28% reductions from 2005 
levels by 2025 submitted to the UNFCCC by the Obama 
Administration in 2016 (ibid.). This goes hand-in-hand 
with a reversal of Trump’s fossil-fuel promotion agenda 
in areas such as fuel standards. Another major field of 
activity pertains to large-scale sustainable infrastructure 
investments. This also involves discussions about green 
Covid relief measures.  
 
The domestic politics that will determine the implementation 
of the Biden Plan are considerably more complex than in the 
EU. On the one hand, there seems to be strong support. Biden 
received many votes from a progressive and young 
Democratic electorate that would in large parts have 
preferred to see Bernie Sanders run against Trump on a 
strong ‘Green New Deal’ platform. During his campaign, in 
efforts to woo more moderate Democrats, Biden tried to 
distance himself from this more radical position, arguing that 
he was campaigning on the basis of his own Plan. 
Simultaneously, he attempted to send the message that he 
takes climate change very seriously, going as far as arguing 
that he “would transition from the oil industry” to fully 
embrace clean energy (Milman 2020b).   
 
On the other hand, as demonstrated by Trump’s 2020 vote 
gains coming from an electorate that is fundamentally 
opposed to climate regulation, the US remains deeply 
polarised. This is clearly visible in Congress, where the 
projected Democratic majority in both chambers now seems 
unlikely, as it would require two Democrat victories in the 
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runoff Senate elections in Georgia in January 2021. Without 
this majority, far-reaching federal climate legislation appears 
out of reach. Although Biden, with his decades-long Senate 
experience, may be uniquely placed to negotiate bipartisan 
deals, the Republican establishment’s appetite for 
cooperation on climate matters seems limited. Even a 
moderate Republican like Mitt Romney, who welcomes the 
leadership change in the White House, has argued against “a 
sharp left turn”, including on climate change (Coleman 2020).  
 
Still, some commentators remain hopeful that Biden could 
forge limited bipartisan progress, for instance on a green 
Covid-19 relief package, much-needed US-wide 
infrastructure renovation and renewable energy support 
(Lavelle 2020). In the absence of solid congressional 
majorities, however, more far-reaching climate measures will 
in all likelihood have to come from presidential executive 
orders. This was a strategy already embraced by Obama – 
with some success, but also major weaknesses: such 
executive action can be more easily attacked, delayed and 
halted by judicial action than federal legislation. It is also 
prone to being reversed by a subsequent Administration.  
 
Other options for Biden to enlarge his room for manoeuvre in 
a polarised context involve domestic coalition-building 
beyond Congress, for instance by reaching out to country-
wide movements that had formed in opposition to Trump’s 
anti-climate policies, such as “We Are Still In” (the Paris 
Agreement) and “America’s Pledge”, led by figures like 
former New York City Mayor Bloomberg and former 
California Governor Brown. Such domestic alliances might 
help adopt meaningful measures across a series of states as 
well as in major urban centres, although these may ultimately 
still be insufficient in scale to support a more ambitious US 
NDC in the absence of federal measures. 
 
Just like in the case of the EGD, the implementation of the 
Biden Plan would be eased if his Administration can 
demonstrate at home that others – primarily China, but also 
key emitters like the EU and India – are doing their share. 
 
US climate diplomacy under Biden 
 
The Biden Plan explicitly foresees “rally[ing] the rest of the 
world to address the grave climate threat” (Biden 2020). This 
translates into an ambition to “lead an effort to get every 
major country to ramp up the ambition of their domestic 
climate targets”, which have to be “transparent and 
enforceable”, preventing other countries from “cheating” 
(ibid.). To this end, Biden intends to deploy “America’s 
economic leverage and power of example” (ibid.). Though 
much more elaborate, the Biden Plan’s external dimensions 
exhibit clear parallels with the EU’s GDD, but include bolder 
leadership claims, such as that of “conven[ing] a climate 
world summit to directly engage the leaders of the major 
carbon-emitting nations … to persuade them to join the 
United States in making more ambitious national pledges” 
(ibid). It is also decidedly more confrontational: Biden wishes 
to “name and shame global climate outlaws” and wants 
among others to hold China “accountable to high 
environmental standards in its Belt and Road Initiative 
infrastructure projects” and export subsidies (ibid.).   
 
Putting these projects into practice will require a major 
change of approach. During Trump’s Presidency, the US 
remained present, but largely passive in multilateral climate 
fora. Bilateral climate relations were virtually inexistent. Sub-
national and civil society actors – around the “We Are Still In” 
and “America’s Pledge” coalitions and involving many 
Democrats – had stepped in through forms of para-
diplomacy. Their efforts constitute a foundation from which 
to re-build trust with third parties. An important step Biden 
envisages is to reverse Trump’s appointments of climate 
deniers to key positions (e.g. Energy Secretary) by bringing in 
credible experts with international networks, particularly in 
the State Department. A major initial signal in this respect is 
the appointment of Obama’s former Secretary of State and 
long-term Senator John Kerry as ‘Special Presidential Envoy 
for Climate” who will also be a member of the National 
Security Council. As a decades-long champion of the climate 
cause, Kerry was instrumental to the successful negotiation 
of the Paris Agreement. He has an international standing and 
network that will facilitate the US re-integration into the 
global climate community. Another step to take for Biden 
must involve living up to earlier US promises to financially 
support third countries’ low-carbon transitions.  
 
Altogether, by re-joining the Paris Agreement and adopting a 
fundamentally different tone, Biden’s Administration will 
contribute to isolating ‘climate outlaws’ like Bolsonaro’s 
Brazil on the global diplomatic scene. Yet, despite its 
ambitions, the domestic constraints that the Biden Plan faces 
may impede the US from instantly re-emerging as a global 
climate leader. Whether it will be able to leave its mark on 
the talks about enhanced ambitions in the run-up to COP 26 
therefore remains an open question.  
 
Towards a ‘transatlantic Green Deal’? 
 
The EGD and the Biden Plan display a number of similarities 
and potential for mutual reinforcement, but also significant 
differences. Striking parallels include the problem analysis: 
both recognise climate change as an existential threat. Also, 
the envisaged policies (e.g. related to ‘clean energy’ and 
mobility) and tools (including regulation and large-scale 
investments) are similar. So is the emphasis on ‘justice’ to 
rally European and US citizens as well as on diplomacy.  
 
At the same time, the two projects differ in framing and 
scope: where the EGD offers a transformative narrative that 
stipulates debates about the EU’s current socio-economic 
model and how to redefine humanity’s relationship with 
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nature, the Biden Plan employs the term ‘revolution’ strictly 
in relation to ‘clean energy’. Biden’s proposed policy is thus 
ultimately about a steered move away from ‘dirty’ energy 
sources and towards greater efficiency.  
Moreover, the politics surrounding the two proposals are 
quite distinct. Making the EGD a success will be difficult 
enough, as it requires aligning the 27 EU member states to 
common targets and policies. Yet, European societies are not 
nearly as polarised as the US, where the political institutions 
exacerbate partisanship and can easily lead to gridlock. 
Considering these similarities while taking due account of the 
differences implies that a ‘transatlantic Green Deal’ is 
currently not readily graspable. If desired, it needs to be 
actively forged as a medium-term project. The similarities 
provide numerous opportunities for stimulating exchanges 
and mutual learning for the common goal of a decarbonised 
future. The shared understanding that any decarbonisation 
has to be socially just equally offers a strong fundament to 
build on. However, this aspect is not accompanied by 
comparable efforts at associating citizens to the co-creation 
of policies determining their destiny. In the EU, the Green 
Deal is set to benefit from wide-reaching efforts to obtain the 
public’s input and buy-in, not just by providing financial 
support; in the US, vulnerable populations are promised 
attention mostly in the form of job creation and/or financial 
compensation. For a ‘transatlantic Green Deal’ to emerge in 
the medium term, greater convergence has to be fostered by 
investing jointly into socio-cultural change that anchors the 
envisaged energy and ecological transitions in continuous 
and unyielding public support so as to guard sustainable 
change from short-term political whims.  
Against this backdrop, there are multiple opportunities for 
the EU to re-engage the US in the short and medium term. 
 
How the EU can revive transatlantic climate relations 
 
Leading EU policy-makers must – and do – understand the 
importance of a reinforced transatlantic partnership for 
effective global climate action, but also that they must not 
overly focus on EU-US relations. While there is no time to lose 
to re-engage the US, the EU’s transatlantic climate diplomacy 
has to be aligned with its own domestic and external policy 
patterns. It should reflect the EGD’s holistic, multi-sectorial 
and multi-level approach as well as its existing bilateral and 
regional climate relationships (e.g. with China, Canada, the 
UK and many developing nations) while taking the US realities 
seriously. This implies a multi-layered bilateral and a multi-




In an effort to support the Biden Administration in 
implementing its Plan, the EU’s outreach should be targeted 
at the different layers of the US political system (federal, 
state, local), while engaging with various types of 
stakeholders, including business and civil society 
communities as well as individual citizens. Central to these 
exchanges should not just be the practical steps towards an 
energy transition, but also more fundamental questions 
related to what kind of society citizens in the transatlantic 
space would like to live in. Such questions can be broken 
down to the sectoral policies at the heart of the EGD, from 
agriculture and food (how do we want to produce what we 
eat?) to mobility and urban space (how do we want to move 
around and live?). 
At the federal level, bilateral dialogues need to be held at the 
highest – presidential and ministerial – levels and with the US 
Administration’s key climate appointees across various 
ministries, importantly including a re-staffed State 
Department. For example, the US-EU Energy Council 
launched in 2009 may be revived or a wholly new institutional 
consultation mechanism created. In parallel, dialogues 
between parliamentarians from the European and national 
parliaments and members of Congress should be reinforced 
in existing fora like the ‘Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue’. In 
the process of developing and negotiating legislative acts and 
policies, the potential for transatlantic information and best-
practices exchange and mutual learning, for instance on 
common metrics to assess the ‘energy transition’, seems 
immense. Fuelling a transatlantic competition for ideas on 
how to best transition can moreover help spur further and 
faster innovation. In its outreach efforts, the EU should not 
just ‘preach to the converted’, but also address those, 
especially among Congressional Republicans, who are 
sceptical of clean energy policies for ideological reasons or 
because they hail from ‘coal states’ (De Botselier 2018). Issue-
linkages between climate/energy and socio-economic 
policies in the framework of the EU’s ‘just transition’ efforts 
might provide useful starting points for such discussions.   
 
In the same vein, the EU should engage with states’ 
executives and legislators across the US. Both the EU and its 
members have long entertained climate-specific relations – 
for instance on matters related to emissions trading – with 
California, reaching new peaks under Trump. Relations with 
other, also Republican-governed states are equally 
important, however, to support the Biden Administration in 
making the case that a clean energy transition can actually be 
“good for business” (ibid.: 2). Moreover, the EU should not 
shy away from mobilising the full potential of its member 
states and their existing ties when creatively developing new 
contacts also by tying in third parties (e.g. Canada).  
 
The same openness should also guide the EU’s outreach at 
the local level: through its support to the European Covenant 
of Mayors, the EU has managed to become the backbone of 
the ‘Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy’, 
which provides an excellent platform for dialogue between 
European and American local politicians and administrators 
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who have to implement the EGD and comparable American 
policies on the ground. 
 
Importantly, and especially to develop a joint medium-term 
vision on the carbon-neutral societies of the future, a key 
component of transatlantic climate engagement should be 
public diplomacy. This implies developing an external 
dimension to the ‘European Climate Pact’. Culture can be an 
important vehicle to engage US urban and rural audiences, 
civil society and businesses in conversations about the future. 
Although the EU Delegation in the US already has this on its 
agenda, the margin for mobilising the EU member states’ vast 
diplomatic network remains enormous. It includes the 
possibility to share and debate local experiences of rolling out 
the European Green Deal beyond its technical-administrative 
dimensions, emphasising how businesses and people live the 
transition, which hopes and expectations they have, which 
anxieties and problems they encounter, what solutions are 
available, how fair and just policies could and do look like etc. 
Successfully engaging publics across the Atlantic in such 
debates, and ensuring their durable support for change, will 
be a make-it-or-breaking issue for the successful 
implementation of the EGD, the Biden Plan and the Paris 
Agreement. 
 
While transatlantic bilateral climate engagement along these 
lines is crucial, the EU-27 (7% of global emissions) and the US 
(14%) can neither individually nor jointly successfully tackle 
the climate challenge without meaningful multilateral 




In relation to multilateral outreach, expectations 
management is key: the US cannot be expected to 
immediately carry the burden of leadership after four years 
of disengagement from global climate politics. It will 
therefore be important to gradually re-engage the country, 
allow for time to domestically attempt to implement major 
aspects of the Biden Plan – notably shaping up a new 
medium-term NDC – and to refine its climate foreign policy 
strategy. A key reason why the 2009 Copenhagen summit 
failed was that the incoming Obama Administration had not 
been able to build momentum domestically, nor to 
sufficiently reach out to key emitters to achieve the level of 
mutual understanding necessary to come to a more 
meaningful global agreement. Replaying this scenario can be 
avoided if other key emitters continue to co-lead during a 
transition phase while engaging with the US about mutual 
expectations. Given the strained Sino-American relationship, 
the EU would be uniquely placed to play this mediating role, 
signalling what space there is for the Americans to co-lead.  
 
More concretely, besides the revival of transatlantic 
relations, the US will be trying to re-invigorate its bilateral 
relations with other major emitters. This ‘multiple 
bilateralism’-based strategy, involving numerous bilateral 
talks that allow for multilateral progress, worked well in the 
run-up to the Paris summit (Belis et al. 2018). It can again 
become the nucleus of multilateral advances. To book a 
success at COP 26, which would imply major emitters’ 
enhanced medium-term ambitions, credible plans towards 
the 2050 target and commitments to climate finance and 
greening the global financial system, the EU should 
encourage such multiple bilateralism and harness it in various 
fora that have successfully served as preparatory arenas for 
climate summits in the past. Among them are the G-7 and G-
20 summits, which in 2021 will be chaired by the COP 26 host 
UK and Italy respectively, allowing two European countries to 
steer the discussions among major emitters. The summits 
provide opportunities to not only better understand the 
United States’ positions, its true ambitions and domestic 
constraints, but also to clarify what the US is willing to invest 
into – and what others are ready to cede to allow for – 
potential American global climate leadership. Discussions 
should focus on the level of ambition parties can bring to the 
table individually and collectively, both in terms of emissions 
reductions and financial support to developing countries. 
Moreover, and to contrast the epic images of Trump’s 
opposition to the nineteen/six partners around climate 
change at past G-20 (e.g. Hamburg 2017) and G-7 (La 
Malbaie, Québec 2018) summits, the 2021 meetings provide 
an opportunity to publicly re-welcome the US to the club. 
Letting Biden shine as a global leader on clean energy would 
give him a visibility that might facilitate the domestic 
implementation of his Plan.  
 
Conclusion: making EU transatlantic climate diplomacy a 
success  
 
2021 opens a window of opportunity for progress towards 
the Paris Agreement’s objectives: decisions are expected on 
medium- to long-term country actions that will lock in policy 
choices paired to financial investments. Central to making the 
right choices during this period will be an effective re-
engagement of the world’s no. 2 emitter, the US. Given past 
cooperation experience and the parallels between the EGD 
and Biden’s clean energy plan, the EU is well-placed to play a 
key role in re-engaging the US via multi-layered and multi-
facetted bilateral engagement and multilateral mediation.  
 
Yet, the success of the Paris Agreement and the EGD does not 
solely depend on what happens in 2021. The EU must guard 
against falling into the ‘presentism’ trap: while it should help 
ensure that short-term policy choices (e.g. Covid recovery 
plans) are green, it should also be reminded that the history 
of global climate politics provides many warnings that 
durable change cannot rely on short-termism. The Trump 
Presidency represented the most telling example of how 
comparatively simple it is to unravel policies that were based 
on global accords and domestic executive action relying on 
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limited public support. The EU is therefore well-advised to 
invest into outreach activities that can contribute to fostering 
continuous and sustainable public support so as to enhance 
the medium-term prospects of a ‘transatlantic Green Deal’.  
 
Whether or not the EU’s climate diplomacy vis-à-vis the US 
bears fruit in the short and medium term will depend on 
several factors. First, it will rely on EU domestic policies and 
its ability to present itself as a credible partner. This credibility 
hinges on demonstrable progress regarding the 
implementation of the European Green Deal.  
 
Second, it will depend on the EU’s diplomatic capacity and 
whether it is capable of reviving the pre-Paris Agreement 
spirit, mobilising its networks of partnerships to help re-
integrate the US into global climate politics. The Union’s role 
could be that of a chief mediator in this regard, facilitating 
multiple bilateral contacts between the US and third parties. 
The G-x summits are just the tip of the ice-berg when it comes 
to opportunities for exchange between transatlantic policy-
makers and their third-country counterparts. Efforts could 
feed into the preparation for COP 26, but also provide the 
foundations for much-needed open channels of conversation 
and mutual learning in the medium term. 
 
 
Finally, the EU must make more use of its public diplomacy to 
reach out to US society beyond the elite level. Citizens will 
have to locally commit to addressing ecological crises and to 
supporting the envisaged transitions as well as measures 
aimed at attenuating possible negative effect on vulnerable 
communities. The EU’s evolving experience with ‘just 
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